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Questions on "animal rights" in a cross-national survey conducted in 1993 provide an 
opportunity to compare the applicability to this issue of two theories of the socio-
political changes summed up in "postmodernity": Inglehart’s (1997) thesis of 
"postmaterialist values" and Franklin’s (1999) synthesis of theories of late modernity. 
Although Inglehart seems not to have addressed human-nonhuman animal relations, 
it is reasonable to apply his theory of changing values under conditions of "existential 
security" to "animal rights." Inglehart's postmaterialism thesis argues that new values 
emerged within specific groups because of the achievement of material security. 
Although emphasizing human needs, they shift the agenda toward a series of lifestyle 
choices that favor extending lifestyle choices, rights, and environmental 
considerations. Franklin’s account of nonhuman animals and modern cultures 
stresses a generalized "ontological insecurity." Under postmodern conditions, 
changes to core aspects of social and cultural life are both fragile and fugitive. As 
neighborhood, community, family, and friendship relations lose their normative and 
enduring qualities, companion animals increasingly are drawn in to those formerly 
exclusive human emotional spaces. With a method used by Inglehart and a focus in 
countries where his postmaterialist effects should be most evident, this study derives 
and tests different expectations from the theories, then tests them against data from a 
survey supporting Inglehart's theory. His theory is not well supported. We conclude 
that its own anthropocentrism limits it and that the allowance for hybrids of nature-
culture in Franklin's account offers more promise for a social theory of animal rights 
in changing times.  
Our first theory is Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 1997) theory of postmaterialism. This has 
generated some of the most replicated results in social science, particularly in relation 
to values and to opinions on ecology and the environment. Although we have found 
no evidence that Inglehart has included human-animal relations in his analyses, other 
writers have claimed that his approach is applicable to them (Aslin & Norton, 1995; 
Jordan, 1998). Inglehart is all the more important to introduce to scholars of human-
animal relations because it has been suggested that attitudes on the environment and 
ecology also influence attitudes to animals (Kellert, 1985, 1993).  
It is important to stress that Inglehart’s theory explicitly is one of human social life; 
that is, it entails the a priori distinction between nature and culture so common in 
social theory. That provides one point of contrast with our second approach, 
Franklin’s (1999) synthetic account of "animals and modern cultures." Franklin 
allows for the hybridity of nature-culture, rather than distinguishing between those 
analytically necessary foci. We develop those differing emphases through contrasting 
the two writers' use of "security."  
After sketching the two theories, we derive hypotheses from Inglehart’s and test these 
against the results from the survey, using a method that Inglehart has used and 
focusing on countries where his postmaterialist effects should be most evident. Our 
results, however, do not support Inglehart’s theory, an outcome we ascribe to its 
anthropocentric framing. Although we do not test Franklin’s theory in the same terms, 
we conclude that there is a need for theories of the hybridity of nature-culture, such as 
Franklin implies, if trends in human-animal relations are to be linked with the broader 
trends of postmodernization.  
Postmodernity and Existential Security  
Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 1997) theory of postmaterialism has been one of the most 
widely used and empirically supported accounts of socio-political changes over the 
last thirty years, and shifts in human-nonhuman animal relations have been a feature 
of those changes. Therefore, the theory should apply as much to this issue as to the 
environmentalism and value-politics where it more usually has been studied. We 
outline the theory here and show why it is reasonable to extend it to human-nonhuman 
animal relations.  
The theory of postmaterialism is a theory of value-change. Inglehart has argued that 
the new "value-orientations" among people born after World War II yield better 
empirical purchase in the study of political movements than the "interests" at issue in 
the commonly deployed class-based theories. Referring to "quality of life" rather than 
to the instrumentally economic rationality typical of modernization, "postmaterial 
values" arose from the conditions that liberated most people in developed countries 
from spending their lives on basic material demands and that opened new 
opportunities for self-expression and aesthetic satisfaction. Inglehart derives his case 
from inter-related arguments on "scarcity" and "socialization." He holds that those 
who grew up under relative prosperity show different value-patterns from those who 
grew up amid scarcity and that the orientation into which any individual is socialized 
remains relatively stable so long as material conditions do not change radically. His 
theory, that is, is one of "existential security," resting on “the fundamental difference 
between growing up with an awareness that survival is precarious, and growing up 
with the feeling that one’s survival can be taken for granted” (Inglehart, 1997, p. 31). 
Although he has found that materialism occasionally may rise in salience, as under the 
difficult economic conditions in Britain in the 1980s, he argues that a trend exists 
towards postmaterialism in all countries that are more developed.  
Inglehart (1997) has recently linked his postmaterialism to postmodernization, using 
this contested term in both its historical and conceptual senses. Historically, he argued 
that while variants of modernization theory? Marxist class-based analyses or Max 
Weber’s account of rationalization (Schluchter, 1981; Sica, 1988)? may have suited 
the emergence of materialism, they no longer fit present conditions. Conceptually, he 
contrasted the determinism, linearity, and ethnocentrism of modernization theories 
with his own allowance for cultural differences and with his recognition that 
postmaterialist values were only part of clusters of values under postmodernization; 
the shading of postmaterialism in a particular country, for example, varies with its 
religious history (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Even with that stress on cultural 
contingency, however, he has continued to find that postmaterialist values are good 
descriptors and predictors of change. In that case, it is reasonable to expect that the 
theory should apply to human-animal relations.  
One of the most significant postmaterialist values that emerged on several fronts 
concerned the extension of civil rights and social inclusiveness, the breaking down of 
boundaries drawn on the basis of ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, and age. They 
were marked, that is, by acceptance of the equal moral subjecthood of former 
"others," and this extended recognition, which began with humans, was not 
necessarily restricted to them. The links between postmaterialism and 
environmentalism are among the most robust findings from the theory, and 
environmentalists have been concerned with such nonhuman others as endangered 
species, battery hens, intensively reared pigs, forests, ecosystems, and particular 
natural places. Postmaterialists, in fact, take principles of ecological harmony as 
models for change.  
Surprisingly, Inglehart has not used attitudes toward animal rights as registers of 
postmaterialism, for the temporal and discursive overlap between animal rights and 
other postmaterial issues suggests that such attitudes should fit his thesis. (Inglehart, 
1997) analyzed a question on the issue but has not published in the area. Other 
writers, however, have argued that the theory is, or should be, applicable to animal 
rights (Aslin & Norton, 1995). They have good reason. The emergence and gradual 
acceptance of animal rights as more than a minority concern has coincided with the 
success of the movements for human rights and environmental responsibility, which 
match his theory, and animal rights has involved similar discourses. Animals have 
increasingly been discussed in the language of oppression, so effective in mobilizing 
other movements. Their homes and habitats are wantonly destroyed. They are 
subjected to cruel experiments, produced for meat under repressive factory systems, 
and hunted for sport. Unable to defend themselves against such oppression, both 
domesticated and wild animals have become increasingly in need.  
In a sense, humans manage and control the world, and animals have become a human 
responsibility. More strongly, the prospect of the extinction of ever more species 
evokes the moral terrain of genocidal dominance. Although animal rights activists are 
distinctive in explicitly claiming the moral equivalence of humans and other animals, 
which is implicit in these discourses, their concerns are widely shared. Similarly, 
although these concerns were not new to the postmaterialist generations, their shift 
from minority positions to at least tacit acceptance in mainstream movements has 
coincided with the emergence of postmaterialism. Because Inglehart seems not to 
have followed the implications of this extension of moral inclusiveness, his social 
theory entails a sense of the social that is purely human.  
In his account of animals in modern cultures, Franklin (1999) drew on different 
understandings of postmodernity and security and also implied a more inclusive sense 
of social.  
Postmodernity and Ontological Insecurity  
Like Inglehart, Franklin (1999) theorized the socio-cultural changes described under 
postmodernization. Where human-animal relations are peripheral to Inglehart’s work, 
however, Franklin took them as his central theme. That focal difference is 
accompanied by a conceptual contrast. Where Inglehart stressed "existential security" 
Franklin drew on theories of "ontological insecurity."  
Franklin developed his analysis through a reading of Tester’s (1992) account of "the 
humanity of animal rights." At the time Tester wrote, animal rights activists were so 
widely seen as young fanatics that he found it unimportant either to question his own 
assumptions, which were largely consistent with that stereotype, or to investigate the 
social composition of support for the issue. When, however, he treated disputes over 
animal rights simply as disputes over what it means to be distinctly, or properly, 
human, he, in effect, begged the question. The issue was the boundary between 
humans and animals. Animal rights activists aimed to achieve full rights for all 
sentient, moral subjects. To be sure, the means that some groups used contributed to 
their misperception. They deemed any violation of those rights to be abhorrent and 
demanding of extreme action. In the popular image of animal rights as a social 
movement, this extremism has overshadowed all else. Nevertheless, since the activists 
drew widespread sympathy for their concerns, if not for their means, the issue 
required a more nuanced and empirical analysis.  
Franklin (1999) observed that support for the principles of animal rights had a wider 
demographic base than suggested in Tester’s identification of it with extreme political 
groups (pp. 183-188). He also noted that many animal rights activists effectively 
repeated Tester’s move? but in reverse. They first collapsed the distinction between 
humans and animals by arguing for moral equivalence but then restored the 
distinction by demanding the complete separation of animals from humanity. Through 
studying trends in the presentation of zoos, in pet-keeping, in hunting and fishing, and 
in agriculture, Franklin showed that this demand runs counter to the emergence in late 
modernity of more companionate, protective, and empathetic patterns in human-
animal relations. These trends also entail granting animals forms of moral 
subjecthood. Rather than the apartheid explicit in strict animal rights, they imply what 
might be called "species multi-culturalism" or a politics of sentimentalization, 
reconciliation, and mutual discovery. They entail, that is, neither the zoocentrism of 
strict animal rights nor an anthropocentric privileging of the human, but hybrids of the 
two. Nor were the trends confined to Tester’s young radicals. Franklin confirmed 
what other analysts have found: Shifts in attitudes toward animals have been 
relatively popular and diffused (Macnaghten & Urry, 1998, pp. 66-67).  
To account for those changes, Franklin drew on the ontological insecurity that such 
prominent sociologists as Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) have attributed to 
postmodernity. We should stress that this concept has a tangled genealogy well 
beyond what we can consider here. "Existential security" in Inglehart’s sense refers to 
the certainty that basic material needs will be met. Ontological insecurity, in the terms 
that Franklin adopted from Giddens (1991, p. 243), refers to a sense of loss of 
continuity and order in events, including those not directly within an individual’s 
perceptual environment. It then describes the senses of confusion, loss, 
unpredictability, and anxiety that many writers have attributed to the churning nature 
of postmodernity and that have been linked to the fragmented and fugitive character 
of labor markets, neighborhoods, communities, and family and domestic relations. It 
has been similarly applied to the privatism and social isolation of modern individuals 
and cultures in the West (Saunders, 1984; Marshall, Rose, Vogler & Newby, 1985, 
1987). In so far as constant innovation in the economic order is a precondition of 
material gain, then existential security may necessarily generate ontological 
insecurity, and the seeming contradiction between it and Inglehart’s existential 
security is then more apparent than substantive.  
On that basis, Franklin (1999) argued that companionate human- animal relations? in 
that they fill the emotional spaces formerly met by enduring human relationships? 
have emerged in response to widespread uncertainty,. Noting that the disruptive 
effects of socio-cultural change are scattered in affluent societies, he then held that the 
extension of moral subjecthood to animals seen in these new companionate relations 
should be expected to span dimensions such as education, class, gender, and age. This 
is consistent with the mounting body of evidence on the inclusion of companion 
animals as members of families (Salmon & Salmon, 1983; Albert & Bulcroft, 1988) 
and on the contribution of animals to human health (Wilson, 1997). Franklin allowed, 
that is, for a sense of the social not restricted to the purely human. That, rather than 
the apparent contradiction between existential security and ontological insecurity, is 
the real point of contrast between his and Inglehart’s theories.  
It allows us to draw different hypotheses from the two accounts. If our extension of 
Inglehart’s postmaterialism to the issue of human-animal relations is justified, support 
for the moral equivalence of humans and animals should be higher among the young, 
the more affluent, and the better educated? where postmaterial value orientations 
should be concentrated. On Franklin’s (1999) argument, however, that support should 
be more broadly diffused. Because concentration is easier to measure than 
diffuseness, we focus on Inglehart in our test. In the next section, we describe the data 
and method we used.  
Data And Method  
We drew our data from the responses to two statements in the 1993 International 
Social Science Programme Survey : "Animals should have the same moral rights that 
human beings do," and "It is right to use animals for medical testing if it might save 
human lives" (Zentralarchiv, 1995). These questions are well suited to our purposes, 
even though we are making post hoc and opportunistic use of them. On our reading of 
Inglehart, agreement with the first should yield a strong result for postmaterialism, 
while agreement with the second would be more consistent with the instrumental 
rationality of materialism. Trends in responses to the two questions should then 
provide a degree of internal checking.  
We have restricted our analysis to 6 of the 21 countries included in the survey. Since 
Inglehart has found that postmaterial effects are strongest in richer countries, we 
selected the United States, West Germany, and Japan. For contrast, we added 
Bulgaria, from the former Eastern Bloc, and the Philippines, as a developing country. 
Finally, because an Australian study has shown data generally support Inglehart’s 
thesis (Bean, 1998) and because Aslin and Norton (1995) have linked Australians’ 
attitudes to animals with postmaterialism, we have included Australia.  
The two statements in the survey, which were Likert-type questions with five 
responses from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, gave us our dependent variables. 
Our independent variables were postmaterial value orientations, age, education, and 
sex. We derived postmaterial value-orientations from Inglehart’s (1977) 4-item scale. 
We operationalized age as 10-year groupings and education as tertiary degree or some 
tertiary education versus no tertiary education. We also included sex, as a control. 
Given the consistent finding that women support animal rights more than do men 
(Pifer, Shimizu, & Pifer, 1994; Aslin, 1996; Hills, 1993), a counter-finding here 
would call our analysis into question. Because income data were not collected in the 
Japanese or Philippine surveys, we were not able to conduct a full test of the effects of 
affluence as such? as would be ideal in any test of Inglehart’s work.  
After rescoring responses to the dependent variables, we analyzed them with Multiple 
Classification Analyses (MCA), a technique that Inglehart (1990) has used. This 
entails the calculation of mean scores for the dependent variables based on values of 
the independent variables. MCA produces beta coefficients, which are standardized 
estimates showing the relative contribution of each of the independent variables. 
Larger beta coefficients indicate stronger effects. We present p values (based on F-
tests) to indicate the probability that the means for each independent variable are 
equal in the population;p values of 0.05 or less suggest we can be reasonably 
confident that the mean scores differ in a given country. Finally, multiple R-squared 
statistics show the amount of variance in the dependent variable that is explained by 
all independent variables combined.  
Analyses  
The full results of the analyses are in Tables 1 and 2. Since both tables show the 
expected differences between men and women? with the exception of Japan on the 
issue of moral equivalence? the results have a certain face validity. The internal 
check, however, introduces a preliminary caution. Although the results for Japan and 
West Germany show the expected gradients between materialists and postmaterialists 
on both questions, the means do not show the expected degree of mutual exclusivity 
between the two sets of responses. The questions then might not be measuring exactly 
what we supposed they would. Even so, the results do not show the expected support 
for Inglehart.  
Table 1 (not available online)  
Table 2 (not available online)  
Table 1 shows mean scores and measures of association for the first dependent 
variable ("Animals should have the same moral rights that human beings do") with 
larger mean scores indicating more agreement with the statement. Value-orientations 
have very little impact on the dependent variable in Australia, Bulgaria, the 
Philippines, and the United States. Inglehart’s schema would not be expected to be 
applicable in Bulgaria and the Philippines, but it is striking that the differences 
between materialists and postmaterialists are slight in the affluent Australia and the 
United States. The effect is somewhat stronger in Japan and in West Germany, where 
it is significant, but the beta coefficients show that values are less important in West 
Germany than age or sex and no more important than sex in Japan. The pattern in age 
is just as striking. It is all but uniformly U-shaped rather than having the linear trend 
expected under Inglehart’s model. In Australia, Japan, and West Germany, where 
postmaterial effects should be strong, support for animals’ moral rights is highest 
among the oldest cohorts. In the other three countries, there is an upturn in support. 
Although the beta coefficients show that age is a relatively strong predictor in most 
countries, its effects do not follow Inglehart’s pattern. Finally, in all but the less 
affluent Bulgaria and the Philippines, tertiary education tends to lower support for the 
moral rights of animals rather than to raise it, as would be expected from Inglehart’s 
thesis.  
Table 2 shows the results for the second dependent variable, "It is right to use animals 
for medical testing if it might save human lives." Values is a good predictor for 
Bulgaria, Japan, and West Germany? where it has either the strongest or second 
strongest impact? but is weak for Australia, the Philippines, and the United States. 
Age again has a relatively strong effect in all six countries. In all but the United 
States, however, the oldest cohort goes against the roughly linear trend. The effect of 
education also runs directly counter to expectations.  
Finally, the multiple R-squared statistics show that only a small amount of the 
variance in both dependent variables is explained by values, age, education, and sex 
combined. In Table 1, the results range from 1.1% for the Philippines to 7.5% for the 
United States and, in Table 2, from 1.3% to 7.4% for the same countries. This 
moderates further the already scant support for Inglehart’s thesis. Indicators that, in 
his terms, are usually important in predicting environmental attitudes and behavior do 
not appear useful for modeling support for animal rights. If only negatively, our 
results are more consistent with Franklin’s argument for the diffuseness of responses 
to human-animal relations.  
Discussion  
Although we have given Inglehart every advantage by including the affluent countries 
where his postmaterial effects should be strongest and by choosing data, variables, 
and a method? all of which have been used to support him? we still found little 
backing for his theory and more trends counter to it. Support for the extension of 
animal rights is substantially established in all six countries? startlingly so. In all, 
however, that support is spread among all age groups and among those with 
materialist as well as postmaterialist orientations. Rather than the expected 
concentration of support from tertiary educated people, we found the opposite. With 
more than 90% of variance left unexplained in Tables 1 and 2, Inglehart’s allowance 
for the cultural contingencies, which are certainly evident here, carries a lot of weight. 
Because his thesis is well supported on other issues? if the link we drew from it to 
animal rights is granted? there must be something specific to this issue that is 
discrepant with the theory.  
We argue that this is given by the framing of postmaterialism, in that the crossing of 
species-boundaries in the assumption of moral equivalence is at odds with its 
anthropocentric focus. Since Franklin’s case for diffuseness better fits with our 
results, we develop that point by returning to the difference between his and 
Inglehart’s versions of postmodernization.  
We originally contrasted the two theories by noting the different emphases in 
Inglehart's existential security and Franklin's ontological insecurity, and we now 
observe that these opposite responses to security imply different a priori assumptions 
over human-animal relations. Inglehart takes an anthropocentric stance. In effect, he 
claimed a distinct human nature, deriving his axiom of "scarcity" from Maslow’s 
"hierarchy of needs," in which full humanness is said to result from the transcendence 
of physiological, or animal, needs.  
To repeat, Inglehart's postmaterialist thesis argues that new values emerge as a result 
of material security. Although these values drive the acceptance of lifestyle variations, 
the extension of rights to others, and the need for environmentalism, they still are 
human-centered.  
Where postmaterialism is, by definition, anthropocentric, Franklin left that issue open 
by blurring the boundary between humans and nonhumans. As we have seen from his 
use of ontological insecurity in postmodernity, companion animals and humans are 
drawn together into increasingly close emotional bonds and arranged in new hybrid 
familial or domestic social relations. The churning nature of postmodern labor 
markets has disturbed normative patterns of conjugal, familial, neighborhood, and 
community life. Challenges to former patterns of gender and interpersonal relations 
have created gaps and absences in our emotional and domestic lives that are now 
filled by new and valuable relations with companion animals.  
Misanthropy describes the commonly held view among environmentalists that 
humans as a species have become out of control, malevolent, and ecologically 
imperialistic; or that they are, in Einarsson’s (1993) summary of the debate, “a foreign 
negative element, or even … a cancer on the environment” (p. 82). As Franklin 
(1999) notes, it is “explicitly tied to a perceived crisis of morality and disorder in late 
modernity” (p. 197) and thus to the same sense of disrupted predictability suggested 
in ontological insecurity. Consistent with what we found in our analyses, it tends to be 
associated with less, rather than more, education (Cartmill, 1993).  
Given the pervasiveness of misanthropy, allowance must be made for it in theories of 
human-animal relations. That, in turn, requires a shift from an anthropocentric 
privilege to a zoocentric inclusiveness. Analysts who apply Inglehart’s 
postmaterialism to human-animal relations repeat the question-begging noted earlier. 
When the distinctiveness of humans is at issue, a theory in which the human is 
privileged from the start cannot be adequate.  
That is not to say that Franklin has solved all the difficulties in the field. The 
distinction between anthropomorphism and misanthropic zoocentrism remains 
problematic. As the discrepant figures in our internal check suggest, people find ways 
of reconciling orientations that appear mutually exclusive. Franklin, however, has 
made a strong case for further investigation into how the social conditions of 
postmodernity affect the practical settlement of such apparently contradictory 
demands in humans' relations with nonhuman others. This might include quantitative 
comparison of human-animal relations in communities that have experienced socio-
economic change? through processes such as migration or loss of labor markets? with 
those in communities that have experienced continuity that is more social and 
tranquil. Similarly, since relationships with nonhumans now should be included in the 
sociology of the family, comparing those relationships in different types of 
households would be instructive. While quantitative study along these lines would be 
revealing, it also would need to be supplemented with comparative ethnographic 
investigation? where the ethnos under study was not restricted from the start to 
humans. The complexity of human-animal relations under postmodernity requires 
such an openness and blend of methods.  
To conclude, we stress that our comparison of Inglehart’s and Franklin’s theories and 
our test of Inglehart are indicative rather than definitive. Inglehart’s postmaterialism is 
too well supported on other issues to be discredited here, and we have not subjected 
Franklin’s approach to rigorous test. Such testing might include quantitative 
comparison of human-animal relations in communities that have experienced socio-
economic change through migration or loss of labor markets with those in 
communities that have had more experience with social continuity and tranquility. 
Similarly, since relationships with nonhumans should now be included in the 
sociology of the family, it would be instructive to compare those relationships in 
different types of households. Although quantitative study along these lines would be 
revealing, it also would need to be supplemented with comparative ethnographic 
investigation? where the ethnos under study was not restricted from the start to 
humans. We also have left difficulties unresolved. The distinction between 
anthropocentrism and misanthropic zoocentrism, for example, remains problematic. 
As the discrepant figures in our internal check suggest, people find ways of 
reconciling orientations that initially seem mutually exclusive.  
All that requires further study. For the moment, we hold that the points of difference 
we have raised and shown here indicate the issues that need to be addressed in a broad 
sociology of human-animal relations. Any number of theories and methods might be 
brought to the study of how the social conditions of postmodernity affect the practical 
settlement of apparently contradictory demands in humans’ relations with nonhuman 
others. But if these are anthropocentric from the start or if nature and culture are 
treated in them as categorically distinct, they will not be adequate to the complexity of 
human-animal relations under postmodernity.  
 
